Book Review: Abortion and Infanticide. by Michael Tooley; Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood. by Kristin Luker; the Law Giveth: Legal Aspects of the Abortion Controversy. by Barbara Milbauef. by King, Robert H.




Book Review: Abortion and Infanticide. by
Michael Tooley; Abortion and the Politics of
Motherhood. by Kristin Luker; the Law Giveth:
Legal Aspects of the Abortion Controversy. by
Barbara Milbauef.
Robert H. King
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional
Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
King, Robert H., "Book Review: Abortion and Infanticide. by Michael Tooley; Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood. by Kristin
Luker; the Law Giveth: Legal Aspects of the Abortion Controversy. by Barbara Milbauef." (1985). Constitutional Commentary. 906.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/906
ABORTION AND INFANTICIDE. By Michael Tooley. 1 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1983. Pp. 441. $29.95. 
ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD. 
By Kristin Luker.2 Berkeley: University of California Press. 
1984. Pp. xvi, 324. $14.95. 
THE LAW GIVETH: LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE ABOR-
TION CONTROVERSY. By Barbara Milbauef.3 New 
York: Atheneum. 1983. Pp. xiii, 363. $21.95. 
Robert H King4 
Over a decade has passed since Roe v. Wade, yet the abortion 
controversy has not subsided. In many respects, it has intensified. 
The moral issue is as unresolved as ever, while the political lines 
are even more sharply drawn. The controversy has so many 
ramifications-medical, legal, social, political, and philosophi-
cal-that it is difficult to get it clearly in view. We should not be 
surprised therefore that three recent books approach it in three 
quite different ways. Michael Tooley presents a closely reasoned 
philosophical argument dealing with the ethics of abortion, Bar-
bara Milbauer attends primarily to the legal issues, and Kristin 
Luker examines the attitudes of participants in the political 
struggle. 
I 
Let us begin with Tooley's treatise, which is about the moral 
status of the unborn. The controversy, as he sees it, turns on 
whether or not the fetus is a person, for only persons can properly 
be said to have rights, including the right to life. That is because 
rights depend upon interests and only persons are subjects of non-
momentary interests. The notion that membership in the human 
species is, in and of itself, sufficient to invest a being with the right 
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to life, he considers to be ethically unsound; the fact that the terms 
"person" and "human" are often used interchangeably only com-
pounds the problem. The concept of person, properly understood, 
connotes certain properties that not all members of the human 
species possess. These properties in tum provide the basis for a 
moral claim on behalf of the being that possesses them. While we 
may not agree as to precisely what these properties are (among the 
possibilities he considers are rationality, agency, self-conscious-
ness, and simply the having of nonmomentary interests) there can 
be no question that the fetus does not yet possess them. But then 
could we not consider the fetus a "potential person" and recognize 
potential persons as having a right to life? He thinks not-arguing 
that we would not so regard animals who might acquire these 
properties by means of an as yet unknown drug. Moreover, by 
invoking what he calls the "moral symmetry principle," he at-
tempts to show that an obligation to preserve the lives of potential 
persons would have as its corollary an obligation to produce more 
persons. Thus, the standard argument against abortion becomes 
also an argument against contraception, which in a time of over-
population few people would agree to. But likewise-and this is 
where Tooley's argument will be shocking to most people-to ac-
cept personhood as the sole ground for acknowledging someone's 
right to life is to clear the way for infanticide as well as abortion, 
since at birth, and probably for several months thereafter, the 
child does not exhibit the defining marks of personhood. While 
we have not achieved sufficient clarity regarding the criteria of 
personhood or adequate data on the development of infants to say 
with certainty at precisely what point they acquire a right to life, 
he is confident that on the grounds he has laid out it would be no 
earlier than three months of age. Thus, as a strictly ethical matter, 
abortion and infanticide come under the same classification. Ac-
cording to this line of argument, we have no more moral reason to 
oppose one than to oppose the other. 
II 
When we tum to Milbauer's book, we enter a different world. 
For her the moral status of the unborn is not an issue. The debate 
is framed exclusively in terms of women's rights. How far are the 
courts prepared to go in securing for women, irrespective of their 
financial status, control over their reproductive processes? As the 
title of her book suggests, she feels that the courts have first be-
stowed a right and then proceeded to take it back. In developing 
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her position, she concentrates on the period between Roe v. Wade 
(1973) and McRae v. Califano (1980). 
As she sees it, the Court in Roe concluded that "a woman had 
the right to choose to have an abortion and that her right to make 
that choice was founded upon her right to privacy, a fundamental 
right guaranteed by the Constitution." This decision produced a 
strong public reaction. Among the many attempts to mitigate its 
effect was the Hyde amendment to the Medicaid appropriations 
bill, first passed in 1976, which "restricted funds for abortions to 
only those women whose lives were in danger." The constitution-
ality of this legislation was tested in the courts several times before 
it was finally upheld by the Supreme Court in McRae. The effect 
of McRae, according to Milbauer, was to withhold from poor wo-
men a right previously granted to all women, since without the 
financial means to secure an abortion it is not a real option for 
them. Since Roe v. Wade, she maintains, "the Court has continu-
ously whittled away at the woman's bodily autonomy, has consist-
ently conditioned her right on the physician's approval, and has 
consigned the Ninth Amendment to a kind of legal purgatory." 
Milbauer provides some interesting background material de-
rived from interviews with "Jane Roe" and her attorneys, a useful 
explanation of certain legal terms likely to be unfamiliar to lay-
men, and, I would judge, a fairly comprehensive overview of the 
pertinent cases bearing on this issue. Yet it is certainly not a dis-
passionate commentary. What she has submitted is a brief on be-
half of "abortion on demand." The overriding issue, as she sees it, 
is women's right to determine their own lives, a right that is 
closely tied to their right to choose an abortion. "Depriving a 
woman of this choice, the most intimate and personal one of all, 
dictates every other choice that will be open to her. To put that 
choice in another's hands is to deny her status as an equal, to deny 
her privacy, to deny her very humanity." 
III 
By comparison, Luker's book is a model of objectivity. In the 
preface she observes that a large proportion of the people who 
read it will already have made up their minds about abortion and 
will probably conclude that she has been "unduly generous with 
the opposition and unfairly critical of themselves." Perhaps so, 
but most readers should find it an illuminating interpretation of 
the social changes that have produced the current controversy and 
a sensitive portrayal of the participants. She has interviewed ac-
tivists on both sides of the issue, and in the latter half of the book 
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she attempts to articulate the world views that support their re-
spective positions. So while the book may not change any minds, 
it should help one to be more understanding of those who are per-
sonally and politically involved with the issue of abortion. 
Luker takes the story back 150 years to the early nineteenth 
century, when abortion, at least in the early months of pregnancy, 
was not considered a serious moral issue. English common law 
prevailed in most states, and it took a generally permissive atti-
tude toward abortion prior to the time of "quickening" (the mo-
ment when the woman first felt the movement of the fetus); only 
thereafter was it considered a criminal act. Around 1860, how-
ever, efforts were begun in many states to pass more restrictive 
legislation, and it was the medical profession that led the way. 
The new legislation made abortion, except to save the woman's 
life, tantamount to murder, reserving for the licensed physician 
the prerogative of deciding when the woman's life was endan-
gered. The rationale for the change was that women had been 
ignorant of the developmental process by which the embryo as-
sumed human form and did not realize the moral implications of 
terminating a pregnancy. Doctors, it was claimed, possessed the 
necessary knowledge and objectivity to determine when an abor-
tion was justifiable. 
Clearly this legislation vested physicians with a great deal of 
moral authority; but it also advanced the cause of their "profes-
sionalization." Regular physicians used the abortion issue to help 
drive out unlicensed competitors, who were largely responsible for 
the abortions being performed at that time. With this new legisla-
tion abortion was still possible, but only if performed by a li-
censed physician in whose judgment it was necessary to preserve 
the life of the woman. Women, meanwhile, were virtually ex-
cluded from the decision-making process. 
For nearly a century abortion was treated as a medical rather 
than a moral issue. Practice varied widely, since it was left to the 
individual doctor to decide what constituted unacceptable risk to 
the woman. In the meantime medical technology had improved 
to the point where it was safer to have an abortion than to have a 
baby. Then, in the mid-50's, reformers began to seek liberaliza-
tion of abortion laws, and in particular broader grounds for per-
forming an abortion, including the emotional well-being of the 
woman and indications of fetal deformity. Interestingly enough, 
it was once again physicians who led the way in getting the law 
changed. While in practice they had wide discretion about 
whether and when to perform an abortion, they were aware that 
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the law could be interpreted much more strictly. By advocating 
more liberal legislation, they sought to bring the law into con-
formity with their behavior. Their advocacy, however, also had 
another effect: it brought the issue of abortion into the public 
domain. 
IV 
During the 1960's a number of states passed relatively liberal 
abortion laws. These laws continued to treat abortion as the tak-
ing of human life, but recognized more grounds for exception 
than the previous laws. The more activist women's groups, how-
ever, did not think the reforms went far enough. They were pre-
pared to support illegal abortion clinics if the doctors insisted 
upon a strict interpretation of the new laws, but that proved to be 
unnecessary. There was apparently no lack of licensed physicians 
who would perform abortions as requested. Then came Roe v. 
Wade and even the most liberal state laws were struck down. 
Henceforth there could be no legal obstacle to abortion in the first 
trimester of a woman's pregnancy. It was a matter strictly be-
tween the woman and her doctor. While this decision had the 
effect of legitimizing prevailing practice in many states, it came as 
a shock to many people who had assumed that because abortion 
was immoral it was not practiced except under the most extreme 
conditions, such as an imminent threat to the mother's life. They 
did not realize that a major social change had preceded Roe. 
Prior to 1973, a new political constituency had begun to form 
and a new claim began to be advanced. The new constituency 
was composed of women, largely working women. For them 
abortion was not simply a necessary evil to be undertaken reluc-
tantly under conditions of exigency; it was a woman's right. The 
opportunity to choose whether and when to have children was, 
they felt, essential to women's aspirations to compete in the work-
place with men. The Court's decision was a triumph for their 
point of view, but it also had the effect of arousing opposition 
from a different type of woman. If for some women abortion 
meant control over their lives and an opportunity to enter "male" 
vocations, for others it meant a devaluing of their primary role as 
mothers and a violent assault on the nascent life they were called 
upon to protect and nurture. The women who became political 
activists in opposition to Roe were homemakers rather than career 
women, moral absolutists rather than relativists, committed to the 
preservation of traditional values rather than the attainment of 
rights previously denied. Yet they were just as passionate in the 
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advocacy of their cause. For at stake was nothing less than their 
status as persons and their vocation as mothers. Devaluing the 
fetus meant devaluing them. Thus, for activists on both sides of 
the controversy, the abortion issue has come to be seen as more 
than just an interesting legal or philosophical question. In their 
eyes, says Luker, it is a virtual "referendum on the place and mean-
ing of motherhood." 
v 
At the end of her book, Luker discusses the prospects for suc-
cess of the two groups: pro-choice and pro-life. She is frankly 
skeptical that either side can prevail because the viewpoint of 
most Americans on the subject of abortion is so profoundly am-
biguous. Any attempt to secure unqualified acceptance for either 
position is almost certain to come up against conflicting values 
concerning the sanctity of life, the responsibilities of parenthood, 
and the limitations of freedom-to mention just a few of the pos-
sibilities. If the pro-life group, for instance, were to press its case 
to the point where the survival of the fetus was given equal weight 
with that of the mother, it wo!!ld almost surely lose public sup-
port. Even before Roe, the general public, irrespective of religious 
tradition, did not consider abortion in defense of the mother's life 
to be wrong. Since then the consensus has broadened to include 
other legitimate grounds for abortion, such as rape, incest, and 
indications of fetal abnormality. Yet when pressed to say that 
abortion is a woman's right under all circumstances and that by 
virtue of the equal protection clause of the Constitution poor wo-
men are entitled to abortions at public expense, most people back 
off. We are apparently not prepared to support "abortion on 
demand." 
It is unlikely, therefore, that either Tooley's or Milbauer's ar-
gument will prove convincing to readers who are not already per-
suaded of the rightness of their positions. Neither author proposes 
the kinds of distinctions and qualifications that are likely to gain 
and hold the middle ground. Tooley's standard of personhood as 
the sole basis for ascribing moral status to the fetus is simply too 
restrictive. It fails to take into account ordinary human sensibil-
ity. Some distinction along the continuum of fetal development is 
undoubtedly in order: the view that life begins at conception and 
hence our obligation to the three-month-old embryo is no differ-
ent than to the three-year-old child is not likely to gain wide ac-
ceptance; yet to make actual personhood the crucial determinant, 
and thereby collapse the distinction between abortion and infanti-
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cide, is sure to offend most people. It gives support to those who 
say that abortion is the first step toward systematic elimination of 
the aged and the infirm, the weak and the defenseless. 
Milbauer, by contrast, presents herself as the champion of a 
certain class of defenseless individuals: indigent women seeking 
an abortion. She reasons that since the government has assumed 
responsibility for the medical care of the poor, it cannot in fairness 
withhold funding for this particular medical service merely be-
cause it is offensive to some people. In addition, she is critical of 
any attempt to restrict women's choice in this area, appealing to 
the right of privacy. Yet here again, some distinctions seem to be 
in order. We do not want to obligate a woman to sacrifice her life 
for the fetus, yet we may want to hold her more accountable for 
the outcome of sexual relations freely entered into than for those 
forced upon her against her will. In the minds of most people, the 
conditions of conception do make a difference-as do the stages of 
fetal development. Milbauer and Tooley, in the forceful advocacy 
of their positions, tend to obscure these distinctions. 
Their presentation of the issues also fails to convey a "sense 
of the tragic," insofar as the loss of potential human life is con-
cerned. Tooley considers the termination of a pregnancy the 
moral equivalent of a decision not to conceive, while Milbauer 
focuses almost exclusively on the plight of the woman who desires 
to control her own destiny. Even Luker, for all of her efforts to 
give a sympathetic portrayal of the viewpoint of activists on both 
sides of the abortion issue, sees it essentially as a woman's issue. 
She too fails to give expression to the deeply held conviction de-
riving from our religious heritage that human life at whatever 
stage of development is a sacred trust. We may in certain critical 
circumstances be obliged to sacrifice a life that has been entrusted 
to us in order to preserve a greater good, but it is none the less a 
sacrifice-the loss of something precious and irreplaceable. We 
have sometimes thought that it was just this sense of the intrinsic 
worth of human life-and the tragic loss sustained by its sacri-
fice-that was the distinguishing mark of our civilization. 
